This article covers the adoption controversy from the Catholic, English perspective. Echoing similar domestic reforms such as that in Washington, D.C. (http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/same-sex_marriage_law_forces_d.c._catholic_charities_to_close_adoption_program/), Catholic adoption agencies in England were compelled to consider a response to a new requirement that they not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The author considers three broad strategies: Rejection of the new regulation, and withdrawal from the work of adoption (i.e., the route chosen by the Catholics in Washington, D.C.), acceptance of the requirement, or by an "arms-length agreement" that would remove "Catholic" from the name of the adoption organization, and severe direct administrative control by the diocese. She further reviews some implications for this latter choice in canon law.

Are states required by the U.S. Constitution to recognize an adoption degree in another state regardless of the parents' sexual orientation. At least one state -- Oklahoma -- and one high-profile commentator -- Lynn Wardle -- say no, that, in the latter's words, "in many situations nonrecognition of lesbigay adoption decrees would be proper and permissible." Wasserman examines four different rationales to support such a conclusion, finding all to be flawed. Wardle's antigay posture, she argues, is contrary to "both Supreme Court precedent and an overriding policy favoring permanency in parent-child relationships."

Coming from a law professor whose sole claim to fame rests on his vigorous and varied attacks on gays' rights, this particular article is remarkably restrained. The basic question he asks is whether U.S. ratification of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption contains any hidden requirements to allow adoption by gay men and lesbians, something he would view as a regrettable outcome. His analysis suggests -- not least because at the time of the HCIA's writing (between 1988 and 1993), the social landscape concerning homosexuality was markedly different than it stands today -- the treaty contains no such stipulation, and in fact leaves much of the details about adoption to the local law of the countries involved. While this result is perhaps not as positive as gay couples would like, neither is it as negative as the author would prefer, a cause for some encouragement.

"Rights talk," writes this author, are a double-edged sword. Those claiming rights (in this case, for same-sex couples to adopt) are often met those opponents also claiming rights (Catholic adoption agencies seeking an exemption from a requirement to consider same-sex couples). Such conflicts show the inherently rhetorical nature of the claim to rights, which constitutes Stychin's primary point. The idea of the right, from this perspective, one upon which much of gay activism depends, from this perspective becomes less of a trump than merely one device among many, a perhaps necessary but not sufficient claim in the public marketplace since it is so easily parried by countervailing claims framed in equivalent terms.

Kohm et al. provide a cursory review of European laws and comparative analysis in order to extrapolate the effect that permissive same-sex parent adoption standards are having on the U.S. Rather than concede the issues as inextricably intertwined, the authors’ proclaim that the “best interest of the child” standard is often subordinated by gay rights concerns. The authors also illogically postulate that trends of low fertility rates correlate with more permissive adoption standards, therefore risking population decline.

This brief note asserts that adoptions by same-sex couples should not be recognized by other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause because this practice abrogates citizens’ rights to establish their own state’s public policy through their legislatures. It argues that Congress should use the Effects Clause to combat such recognitions.

A student-written note, this piece analyzes the inconsistent stances of those states that deny same-sex couples the right to marry, yet allow them to adopt children. The author urges courts to reconcile these inconsistencies by incorporating broader definitions of family and relationships into same-sex marriage cases. The author suggests that such an approach would allow courts to conclude that gay men and lesbians have a fundamental right to marry that states could not legally impede.

This article provides an economic analysis of the foster care system and the barriers to entry that same-sex partners must overcome to adopt a child. It argues that providing homosexuals with adoptive and other rights that heterosexuals enjoy would increase demand for adoption and reduce costs of foster care and of social welfare systems.

Building on the author’s previous work asserting the morality of gay rights, this article argues that anti-gay adoption statutes in Florida and Oklahoma are immoral because they tangibly harm children (often relegating them to the foster care system) and use children as a means to send a message of disapproval about homosexuality.

Proposed legislation in the Texas Senate would prevent lesbians and gay men from becoming foster parents. A Fourteenth Amendment analysis of the legislation is followed by a discussion of a Florida case, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services [157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001)], in which a federal court upheld a Florida ban on adoptions by lesbians and gay men. Rather than discriminate by statute, the author suggests a case-by-case approach to child placement that includes sexual orientation as one among multiple considerations.

A general discussion of same-sex parenting is followed by specific attention to the legal status of same-sex co-parents in Missouri, which is unsure at best. This article may be helpful to persons researching developing law on same-sex parenting in conservative states. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the author advocates that courts use equitable theories to protect children born to same-sex couples.

This discussion of “the presumption of legitimacy” in parenting cases reveals tensions between some feminist theorists and gay rights advocates. The author suggests an approach to parentage cases that emphasizes genetics and gestation as central to recognition of gender equality. In particular, she examines how a biological emphasis may lead to different treatment for heterosexual and lesbian couples, in opposition to gay male couples, who seek legal recognition as parents of a child.