An unusual aspect to this review article of federal Title VII as well as state cases is the inclusion as Part III a discussion of the Solomon Amendment that withholds federal funding from schools that deny access to military recruiters (see Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006)). Given the exceptional status of the military, the decision to include this material here among "ordinary" employers can be questioned. Nevertheless, like the other articles in this special issue, the material is succinct, offering a good broad sweep of the field especially helpful to nonspecialists.

The rationale of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) that protects against sex stereotyping discrimination can protect a transsexual "experiencing discrimination based on the failure to conform to the employer's expectations of how stereotypical men and women act," it does not necessarily offer a useful precedent for a transsexual who in fact conforms to such stereotypes, but nonetheless suffers discrimination because gender identity does not match biological sex. The author reads Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006) as filling this gap. (Later opinions in this case continued to favor the employee; see 525 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2007); 577 F.Supp.2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008)). This outcome promises to bring transsexuals fully within the protections of Title VII's "because of ... sex" rule, an achievement currently denied to other sexual minorities like gay men and lesbians because, as Eno notes, "Transsexualism is about being a man or a woman, not about being attracted to a man or a woman."

A federal court decision in Utah is called into question by the author who disagrees with the court’s reasoning in denying Title VII protection to a preoperative transsexual who was fired from her job for using the women’s restroom while she still had male genitalia. The author argues that the court made a mistake in choosing to define a preoperative transsexual in accordance with her biological sex. Rather, the court should have classified that plaintiff as a “female who was discriminated against because she happened to have male genitalia.”

In light of recent acts of discrimination against transgenders (the article highlight the case of the Largo, Florida, city manager fired a week after revealing his transsexuality, but one could also point to Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.Supp.2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008)), the authors present an argument that "the Title VII definition of 'sex' should be expanded and thus interpreted to include transgender." To achieve this outcome, they confront earlier case law representing the alternative view of a narrow definition of the term such Ulane v. Eastern Airline, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (pilot fired after changing sex), and analyze newer decisions that have extended sex stereotype protection in at least some jurisdictions, e.g. Smith v. City of Salem, 369 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 2004) (firefighter diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder forced to resign on account of "no longer acting 'masculine enough'"); see also Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1995).

According to McCarthy, two strands of Title VII jurisprudence are headed for collision, with transgenders caught between them. He first describes the supportive ruling of Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004), which allowed a male-to-female transsexual firefighter to proceed with a wrongful termination suit against the city's fire department. On the other stands Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006), affirming an employer's right to impose a physical appearance standard on a female casino bartender who refused to comply with orders "to wear stockings and nail polish and to wear their hair 'teased, curled or styled" and to wear "face powder, blush and mascara,” as well as “[lipstick] . . . at all times.” McCarthy reasonably sees a conflict here, and worries that, because on "the one hand, Smith stands for the proposition that trans employees are entitled to the same basic rights as other employees [while on] the other hand, Jespersen tells us that employers may set strict, gender-based personal appearance guidelines," future legal battles clarifying the rights of transgenders are assured.

Millman provides a concise practitioner’s guide to recent statutory and case law on the issue of employment discrimination. Summaries are culled from New York, New Jersey, and California cases that utilize gender identity, sex, sexual orientation, and disability discrimination as litigation claims. The article goes on to provide advice to employers and briefly describes federal protections and developments in other jurisdictions.

Contrary to what some might have expected, the review offered by Perifimos suggests that women's colleges are more comfortable dealing with female-to-male transsexuals than with male-to-female. Her major complaint is that such schools -- she provides specific information on Smith, Mount Holyoke, and Barnard -- have no explicit policies on transgender students, making them vulnerable to the inequities of case-by-case determinations. If nothing else, their application and enrollment is unnecessarily stressful because they do not know in advance how the schools will respond to their presence. Taking a proactive role in this area, writes Perifimos, "will ensure that colleges preserve their own missions as well as the dignity of transgender students."