More sociological than legal in emphasis, this article discusses the comments of respondents to a qualitative study of lesbian parents in the United Kingdom. Respondents discuss routes to conception and involvement of fathers in children’s lives.

Three parent family constellations are becoming more common. Recent cases in Canada -- e.g., A.A. v. B.B., 83 O.R.3d 561 (2007) -- illustrate a possible future within the United States, where third parents have been typically judicially recognized only "a second father for the purposes of collecting child support in a heterosexually headed family where the mother has divorced and remarried." Lacking is any routine status of "two parents performing the full panoply of parenting duties and a third parent providing limited social parenting," as is the hope for families headed by same-sex couples. The author analyzes the Uniform Parentage Act to see what changes would be required "to accommodate multiple parenthood within this population subset."

Anderson, the HIV project director at Lambda Legal Defense, provides an excellent account of the difficulties encountered by LGBT and HIV positive men and women who seek the use of assisted-reproductive technologies (“ART”). These barriers include restrictions on sperm donation by gay and HIV positive men, denial of insurance coverage for ART, and denial of ART based on the provider’s religious beliefs or biases. This article provides a summary of the various types of ART and defines the basic terminology involved. In addressing the barriers to ART, Anderson makes reference to federal disability law, federal constitutional rights, FDA regulations and nonbinding recommendations, state laws relating to disability and insurance policies, and federal and state caselaw. The last part of the article describes various legal strategies to challenge the barriers LGBT and HIV positive men and women face when attempting to use ART. In the discussion of legal strategies, Anderson gives an account of recent caselaw where Lamda Legal has represented litigants.

Parent-child relationships are impacted when states take conflicting positions on whether to recognize a same-sex relationship. The author advocates changes to the Uniform Parentage Act to incorporate more gender-neutral principles, to promote consistency in the law, and to “avoid treating children differently based on their parents’ marital status.”

Recent headline events -- the author specifically cites the raid on the Yearning for Zion compound in Texas on suspicions of polygamy (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YFZ_Ranch) as well as court cases A.A. v. B.B., [2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, and Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) -- have called attention to the priority family law has placed on the two-parent dyad, either to enforce or challenge it. Appleton aligns herself with those who support "multi-parentage," in which a child can have more than two parents, and writes to deepen and elaborate the defense of that view. She particularly calls attention to the ways in which the field's mantra to "child's best interest" could be fundamentally reshaped. Law does not merely recognize preexisting interests, but helps to shape them. She favors "a more pluralistic and nuanced approach that respects diversity among families and is sufficiently capacious to honor a given child's experience."

This discussion of “the presumption of legitimacy” in parenting cases reveals tensions between some feminist theorists and gay rights advocates. The author suggests an approach to parentage cases that emphasizes genetics and gestation as central to recognition of gender equality. In particular, she examines how a biological emphasis may lead to different treatment for heterosexual and lesbian couples, in opposition to gay male couples, who seek legal recognition as parents of a child.

Baker believes that "family law as a discipline is shifting from a set of rules designed primarily to regulate sexual relationships between adults to a set of rules designed to regulate parental relationships between adults and children." Decreased emphasis on marriage has created a "desperate need of a system to determine parenthood." The role played by social arrangements like marriage can now, she suggests, be played by biology. The values of parental "bionormativity" are that it should be private ("meaning that the state has no legitimate interest in regulating, but also no requirement to finance, parenthood") and binary ("there are at least two and only two parents"), and discourages functional parents (those who, while lacking a biological tie to the child, invest time, love and money). While the author claims that a bionormative regime does not "necessarily follow conventional political lines" -- in other words, that this is not fancy theoretical dress for fundamental conservative social policies -- it is difficult to take that assertion seriously. Pointing out the possibility that in that environment "someone eager to legitimize families with gay parents may be enthusiastic about a binary requirement for parenthood because a binary rule makes it more likely that a non-biological related partner will retain legal status," it seems more likely that it will disfavor such partners in the event of split, given the disfavor of "functional" parents.

Building on the author’s previous work asserting the morality of gay rights, this article argues that anti-gay adoption statutes in Florida and Oklahoma are immoral because they tangibly harm children (often relegating them to the foster care system) and use children as a means to send a message of disapproval about homosexuality.

Writing as part of a larger symposium on the fortieth anniversary of the Loving decision, Ball considers the detail that the plaintiffs in that famous case were also parents. Laws against miscegenation were often justified in terms of the potential offspring of such unions, and Ball finds that the concerns about children are echoed in today's conservative arguments against same-sex marriage. Both share the feature of essentializing a dualistic understanding of race and gender, leading the author to conclude that while most courts reject the relevance of Loving to same-sex marriage, "that case would seem to be highly relevant to an equality-based challenge to same-sex marriage bans given that the optimal parenting justification for those bans is grounded ... in the idea of natural, essential, and predetermined differences between men and women that is similar to the notion of natural, essential, and predetermined differences between whites and blacks that served as the normative foundation for the antimiscegenation regime."

The student author makes an intriguing proposal built upon the observation that "the debate over gay marriage [has] evolved into a balancing act that considers not only the rights of same-sex couples,but also the rights of these couple's children." Noting the rationales in cases like Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006), and Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006), the author sees a potential opening in arguments for same-sex marriage, one based on "an Equal Protection challenge based on a child's right to presumed legitimacy at birth." While interesting on its face, the article perhaps does not fully confront the unintended fallout of making marriage legitimacy a function of procreation rather than, as it is for heterosexuals, a union between two adults.

In many states, family law has not responded quickly to accommodate the various permutations of the modern American family. Lesbian and gay families, in particular, are affected by the slow evolution of family law. Some courts, nonetheless, have upheld child support obligations of parents in same-sex families under equitable principles. Similarly, the American Law Institute supports impositions of child support via “parents by estoppel.” The author of this article provides an overview of the topic and supplies an array of recommendations for courts considering the issues.

Since 1985, gay men have been prohibited from donating blood, as an effort to prevent the spread of HIV through transfusions. In June of 2010, a committee of the FDA recommended that the policy remain in force. For similar reasons, the FDA has identified "men who have sex with another man in the preceding 5 years" [MSMs] as the number one risk factor to be screened for communicable disease risk when seeking to donate sperm. While not functioning as an outright bar on donation, these risk factors could serve as a de facto bar and thus as a means of discrimination against gay men. Boso weighs the strengths and weaknesses for a variety of litigation strategies -- whether, for example, to sue the FDA, or the sperm bank in federal or state courts -- he hopes will "be effective in ending discrimination against gay and MSM potential sperm donors."

Bowen raises the important question of how the different legal relationships between each parent to the child -- where one partner is the biological parent or primary adopter, while the other is a second adoptive parent -- impact the dynamics of the family itself. Research suggests that "second parent adopters had much less emotional power in the family, but often had more economic power," setting up complementary insecurities. Unawareness of the rights and obligations that have been created in this situations, and lack of confidence in these legal protections when known, combine "to undermine these families on both a macro and micro level." Bowen recommends the creation of new legal presumptions about parenthood that will reinforce these family structures.

This article provides an economic analysis of the foster care system and the barriers to entry that same-sex partners must overcome to adopt a child. It argues that providing homosexuals with adoptive and other rights that heterosexuals enjoy would increase demand for adoption and reduce costs of foster care and of social welfare systems.

A general discussion of same-sex parenting is followed by specific attention to the legal status of same-sex co-parents in Missouri, which is unsure at best. This article may be helpful to persons researching developing law on same-sex parenting in conservative states. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the author advocates that courts use equitable theories to protect children born to same-sex couples.

Building upon Martha Fineman's suggestion that "governmental support for the family ought to support relationships of dependency rather than the adult sexual bond between husband and wife," Cain illustrates the ways in which "current law is biased against dependent children in non-traditional families." Looking at three examples--filing status under the federal income tax, tax credits, and state inheritance taxes, she hopes policy makers will amend laws so that "tax rules that are intended to provide benefits to households with minor dependent children...provide those benefits to all households with minor dependent children."

This article covers the adoption controversy from the Catholic, English perspective. Echoing similar domestic reforms such as that in Washington, D.C. (http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/same-sex_marriage_law_forces_d.c._catholic_charities_to_close_adoption_program/), Catholic adoption agencies in England were compelled to consider a response to a new requirement that they not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The author considers three broad strategies: Rejection of the new regulation, and withdrawal from the work of adoption (i.e., the route chosen by the Catholics in Washington, D.C.), acceptance of the requirement, or by an "arms-length agreement" that would remove "Catholic" from the name of the adoption organization, and severe direct administrative control by the diocese. She further reviews some implications for this latter choice in canon law.

David Cruz examines the ideology of the heterosexual reproductive imperative--the belief that the "species and society must be reproduced [and that] this is naturally and properly done only by women and men acting together, and women, queer, and transfolk should just recognize the primitive truth of that and willingly bear the burdens of laws designed to reinforce this natural reality"--for its impact upon women's reproductive autonomy, same-sex marriage claims, and transgender demand for recognition.

Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951(Vt. 2006), is a complicated interstate custody dispute between lesbian ex-partners involving conflicting decisions of Virginia and Vermont state courts. Dye provides a detailed history and analysis of the situation and the more recent Vermont decision, which has resulted in a conflict that “will have to be resolved by the United States Supreme Court.”

Artificial insemination [AI] poses a range of legal unknowns for lesbian couples. Attempts to clarify the relationship (or intended lack of one) between the semen donor and the recipient are not always enforced by courts. "Contracts for the donation of sperm may not be enforceable and the recipient of sperm may not be able to ensure that the donor will not seek custody at a later time. Similarly, the donor of sperm would be unable to terminate his parental rights or obligations through these contracts." The legal vehicle intended to resolve some of the issues, the Uniform Parentage Act, has been unevenly adopted by the states, leaving disputes arising from AI transactions difficult to resolve. The authors hope for clarifications to the UPA, as well as acceptance "of contracts between sperm donors and donees."

This rich legal history of same-sex parenting in America is punctuated by detailed analysis of significant cases from around the country. A traditional approach is presented in Nancy S. v. Michele G. [279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991)], while a third-party treatment of same-sex coparents appears in five cases: In Re Olivia H. [101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Ct. App. 2000)]; In Re E.L.M.C. [100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004)]; In Re H.S.H.-K. [533 N.W. 2d 419 (Wis. 1995)]; E.N.O. v. L.M.M. [711 N.E. 2d 886 (Mass. 1999)]; and T.B. v. L.R.M. [786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001)]. Judicial recognition of same-sex coparenthood occurs in two analyzed cases: V.C. v. M.J.B. [748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000)] and In Re L.B. [122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005)]. Assisted reproduction cases involving same-sex parents include: Rubano v. DiCenzo [759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000)] and Elisa B. v. Superior Court [117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005)]. Enforcement of child support obligations in alternative insemination circumstances is discussed in Kristine H. v. Lisa R. [117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005)]. In addition to these listed cases, which are discussed in detail, several related cases receive passing attention. The article will be especially valuable to attorneys and researchers seeking citations and legal arguments.

This article proposes an alternative framework for settling child custody disputes among lesbians. This framework incorporates a mediation model that grows from and is supported by the local lesbian community. The article discusses why lesbian families are not adequately represented within existing court frameworks.

Goldhaber considers the impact on children of state Defense of Marriage Acts (“mini-DOMAs”), which deny recognition of the legal status of same-sex couples. It argues these states should allow both biological and non-biological parents in same-sex couples to have visitation/custody rights, when it would be in the best interest of the children.

Emphasizing the need to protect the children of same-sex households, Graham observes that while the "debate on the legitimacy of same-sex partnerships has concentrated largely on the partners' relationship with one another...when considering the right of a child to have the parent/child relationship recognized between the two partners who intend to be his or her parent, the debate should focus on the children, rather than the partners." She analogizes from the immigration case of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), which argued that while adult illegal immigrants should suffer the consequences of their chosen illegal status, those disabilities should not necessarily extend to their children who did not choose the manner of their entry to this country. Likewise, the fallout of the adults' choice "to create a family unit not recognized or protected by state law" should not exact penalties on the children of those families.

After a fertility doctor refused to perform an intrauterine insemination procedure due to his religious beliefs -- there was a disagreement whether he objected to the patient's status as a lesbian or as an unmarried woman -- the patient sued for a violation of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. The California Supreme Court held, relying upon Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that there exists no First Amendment "exemption from a neutral and valid law of general applicability." Doctors are therefore not allowed to refuse to provide medical treatments due to their own religious beliefs, with two exceptions: The doctor can either cease to provide that service completely, or can refer the patient to another nonobjecting doctor within the same practice. The commentator views this as a realistic compromise. This ruling can be read in the context of moves by President Obama to overturn the Bush administration's hastily enacted "Provider Refusal Rule," which went into effect the day Obama took office, that has allowed doctors to claim such a religious exemption.

This brief note asserts that adoptions by same-sex couples should not be recognized by other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause because this practice abrogates citizens’ rights to establish their own state’s public policy through their legislatures. It argues that Congress should use the Effects Clause to combat such recognitions.

Former partners of lesbians who choose to become parents through alternative insemination may be required to provide child support under varying legal theories, including estoppel and conflicts with public policy. Scenarios are presented through close examination of four court opinions: Elisa B. v. Superior Court [117 P. 3d 660 (Cal. 2005)]; Kristine H. v. Lisa Ann R. [117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005)]; L.S.K. v. H.A.N. [813 A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)]; and T.F. v. B.L. [813 N.E. 2d 1244 (Mass. 2004)]. After a survey of the case law landscape, the author offers “precautionary measures for same-sex parents” that may protect the interests of their children.

Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898 (N.C. 1998), "took custody away from a father who had been raising his two sons alone for years, merely because he was involved in a committed relationship with another man," and remains good law in the state. Huffman "aims to bring fresh attention to Pulliam and proposes a better standard for determining child custody in North Carolina when one parent is homosexual." He proposes the overturning of Pulliam "to return North Carolina to a true nexus test" that requires a proof of a connection between the alleged changed circumstances and the welfare of the child, and that would require "specific evidence of harm to the child from the sexual activity of the parent, thus reflecting the same standard for all North Carolina parents."

Kohm et al. provide a cursory review of European laws and comparative analysis in order to extrapolate the effect that permissive same-sex parent adoption standards are having on the U.S. Rather than concede the issues as inextricably intertwined, the authors’ proclaim that the “best interest of the child” standard is often subordinated by gay rights concerns. The authors also illogically postulate that trends of low fertility rates correlate with more permissive adoption standards, therefore risking population decline.

The evolution of same-sex parenting rights in California is given both a historical and a theoretical examination in this article. The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and recent decisions by the California Supreme Court receive the bulk of attention: Elisa B. v. Superior Court [117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005)]; K.M. v. E.G. [117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005)]; and Kristine H. v. Lisa R. [117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005)].

A student-written note, this piece analyzes the inconsistent stances of those states that deny same-sex couples the right to marry, yet allow them to adopt children. The author urges courts to reconcile these inconsistencies by incorporating broader definitions of family and relationships into same-sex marriage cases. The author suggests that such an approach would allow courts to conclude that gay men and lesbians have a fundamental right to marry that states could not legally impede.

Proposed legislation in the Texas Senate would prevent lesbians and gay men from becoming foster parents. A Fourteenth Amendment analysis of the legislation is followed by a discussion of a Florida case, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services [157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001)], in which a federal court upheld a Florida ban on adoptions by lesbians and gay men. Rather than discriminate by statute, the author suggests a case-by-case approach to child placement that includes sexual orientation as one among multiple considerations.

A clear overview of the science and ethical issues of embryonic technologies precedes an examination of case law and prediction of how the Court should rule on genetic modification of embryos predisposed to an undesirable sexual orientation. Paonessa articulately surmises that the state’s interest arises at viability, and prior intervention is insufficient to preclude the use of these technologies should they become available.

K.M. v. E.G. [117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005)] is the focus of this discussion of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). The author asserts that the court improperly applied the UPA, although she supports the ultimate outcome of the case, in which each lesbian partner was granted the status and duties of a “parent.”

Reed and Kohlhaas provide an overview of Indiana case law addressing two family law issues important to homosexuals. The authors first provide a history of cases addressing property rights gained during non-marital cohabitation, including cases involving heterosexual couples which may be applicable to homosexual couples. The authors then detail the cases addressing the status of homosexual parents in child custody and adoption proceedings.

In her analysis of 78 dissents in appellate cases involving gay, lesbian, and bisexual parents between 1975 and 2004, the author posits that dissenting opinions are a valuable source of new information about cases and legal issues at hand. The role of dissenting opinions in family law and sexuality and law cases is also more broadly discussed.

While some authors are skeptical about the obligation of states to recognize same-sex adoptions from other states (see, for example, the review by Rhonda Wasserman, "Are You Still My Mother?: Interstate Recognition of Adoptions by Gays and Lesbians," 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 1-83 (2008)), the Tenth Circuit finds in Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) just such a requirement in the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Advances in assisted reproductive technology (ART) have begun to diminish the “genetic link in defining parentage.” Increasingly, legislatures and courts are recognizing the importance of “social parents,” who act as parents to children although possessing no genetic link. The author defines lesbian legal theory and then uses this critical method to examine the link, or lack thereof, between genetics and parenthood. Finally, she examines how ART and morphing social patterns are affecting the evolution of American family law.

The authors examine in detail three California Supreme Court decisions handed down in August 2005 affecting lesbian parental rights: Kristine H. v. Lisa R. [117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005)], Elisa B. v. Superior Court [117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005)], and K.M v. E.G [117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005)]. After discussing the decisions, the authors address questions of California law left open and the potential ramifications of the decisions for other states.

"Rights talk," writes this author, are a double-edged sword. Those claiming rights (in this case, for same-sex couples to adopt) are often met those opponents also claiming rights (Catholic adoption agencies seeking an exemption from a requirement to consider same-sex couples). Such conflicts show the inherently rhetorical nature of the claim to rights, which constitutes Stychin's primary point. The idea of the right, from this perspective, one upon which much of gay activism depends, from this perspective becomes less of a trump than merely one device among many, a perhaps necessary but not sufficient claim in the public marketplace since it is so easily parried by countervailing claims framed in equivalent terms.

This short article presents a refutation of common arguments against the fitness of homosexuals as parents. The article argues against claims that children of homosexual parents will become homosexuals, that homosexual households produce troubled young adults, and that “dual-gender parenting” is superior to “homosexual parenting.”

In this analysis of the California case of K.M v. E.G. [117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005)] the author argues that state legislatures should more clearly define parenthood in light of recent advances in reproductive technologies. She asserts that parents using in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, ova donation or sperm donation should have statutorily defined rights.

Turner’s article begins with a discussion of Holtzman v. Knott[533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995)], the first United States decision to recognize a lesbian partner as the “de facto parent” of her partner’s biological child conceived and born during the relationship. After a summary of the case, Turner explores the sociopolitical factors leading to the Wisconsin decision and its varying reception in other states.

Wald explores the parentage issues affecting children conceived using assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and children resulting from extra-marital affairs. She analyzes how courts have traditionally determined who should be recognized as legal parents. The author argues that courts should entertain parenting, custody, and visitation actions brought by as many adults as have meaningfully contributed to a child’s parenting.

Coming from a law professor whose sole claim to fame rests on his vigorous and varied attacks on gays' rights, this particular article is remarkably restrained. The basic question he asks is whether U.S. ratification of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption contains any hidden requirements to allow adoption by gay men and lesbians, something he would view as a regrettable outcome. His analysis suggests -- not least because at the time of the HCIA's writing (between 1988 and 1993), the social landscape concerning homosexuality was markedly different than it stands today -- the treaty contains no such stipulation, and in fact leaves much of the details about adoption to the local law of the countries involved. While this result is perhaps not as positive as gay couples would like, neither is it as negative as the author would prefer, a cause for some encouragement.

Are states required by the U.S. Constitution to recognize an adoption degree in another state regardless of the parents' sexual orientation. At least one state -- Oklahoma -- and one high-profile commentator -- Lynn Wardle -- say no, that, in the latter's words, "in many situations nonrecognition of lesbigay adoption decrees would be proper and permissible." Wasserman examines four different rationales to support such a conclusion, finding all to be flawed. Wardle's antigay posture, she argues, is contrary to "both Supreme Court precedent and an overriding policy favoring permanency in parent-child relationships."

The author considers the problem of ascertaining, from the particular view of Israeli law, parenthood of a child who was conceived by the egg of one lesbian partner being carried to term by the other. Because current law "cannot provide an adequate response," she proposes legislative changes that will allow recognition "through appearance before a registry official." Until such time, however, the Family Court will have jurisdiction over this question.

In K.M. v. E.G. [117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005)], the California Supreme Court held that a lesbian who had donated her eggs to her partner and had helped raise the resulting children had legal parentage claims. Zapotocny explores this and other cases involving same-sex unions and the custody of children. The article includes a discussion of California surrogacy law, and an exploration of legal doctrines which may protect same-sex parents.

The California Supreme Court recently decided that the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) encompassed the circumstances of a former lesbian couple who had conceived a child through alternative insemination. The unnamed author suggests that the court should have declined to extend the UPA as this would have alerted the legislature that the UPA needs reformation to address current family structures.