The author recommends Canada as a model of marriage incrementalism for the United States. Under this scheme, "a more effective constitutional approach may be to push for more state laws banning sexual orientation discrimination. After this, advocating for state civil unions and then federal recognition of civil unions are crucial steps toward same-sex marriage." In this sense she is arguing a version of William Eskridge's Equality Practice (Routledge, 2002), in which he counsels postponing marriage rights for gay men and lesbians until the majority of Americans have grown comfortable with the idea; and against James Donovan's argument that rights are not the kind of thing that can be parceled out without doing damage to the idea of the right itself ("Baby Steps or One Fell Swoop?: The Incremental Extension of Rights is Not a Defensible Strategy," 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1 (2001)). Whether one accepts Alquist's view hinges largely on whether one accepts her claim that "Regardless of what same-sex relationships are called or how they are perceived, same-sex couples deserve equality and for now, at a minimum, equality needs to mean access to the federal benefits and obligations afforded heterosexual married couples." Some believe that the primary good of marriage -- however useful the government benefits may be -- is in fact the way it changes the perception of the same-sex relationship as being valued and worth supporting. Those who prioritize these intrinsic intangible benefits of marriage over the economic and practical ones, will probably continue to push for marriage.

This student note advances a commonly held, but erroneous argument that marriage is an intrinsically religious institution, and thus civil laws regulating it are unconstitutional. While well-intentioned, the position ignores the historical development of marriage in Western Civilization, in which Christianity came late to having any specific interest in it. The church wedding was elevated to the status of a sacrament only in the fifteenth century, and the presence of a priest required for a valid and binding marriage not until 1563 (see Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500-1800 (1979)). The secular interests in marriage have always been the more fundamental. So while this author argues that the state should cease to regulate marriage and leave these to religion, and instead offer civil unions, in fact it is as validly argued that the proper solution is the reverse.

Family and domestic relations in Israel are governed by religious courts, which not only make no allowances for same-sex unions, but oppose them. This article offers an impressive review of the legal options available to gay and lesbian couples. The overall lesson is that, within the confines of the theocratic institutions, a secular judiciary has operated with sensitivity and flexibility, but any ultimately resolution must come from the Knesset.

When same-sex marriages become available, should corporate-sponsored domestic partner benefit programs be abandoned? This author votes no, and offers as reasons that couples may choose not to formalize relationships in order to avoid the stigma of homosexuality, that state recognition often results in something less than true marriage, and that domestic partner programs remain a "prudent business decision." While the latter two circumstances may justify corporate benefit programs, Kolli offers an unconvincing case that there exists a broader societal interest in maintaining marriage substitutes after true marriage becomes available. In that situation the stronger argument may be that those foregoing marriage should also forgo the benefits of marriage.

Part of a 2006 symposium, LGBTQ Law 2006: Legal Issues Affecting Ourselves and Our Families, Prol's paper criticizes the New Jersey opinion in Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006), for stopping short of requiring full marriage equality. The New Jersey legislature has failed, and indeed must necessarily fail to provide civil unions that are equivalent to marriage in all but name. In addition to noting the lack of federal recognition, Prol recounts the ways in which later state legislation neglects to include civil unions. He illustrates the point through new laws adding irreconcilable differences as a basis for divorce, but which did not explicitly extend to civil unions. The result is that New Jersey attorneys "may have to engage in expensive motion practice" to claim this ground to terminate civil unions, a cost not borne by heterosexual married couples. The bottom line is that the label "marriage" offers value not contained in civil unions, and consequently unions are inherently unequal and inferior to state-recognized marriages.

Purvis provides a potential line of argument for those seeking domestic partnership rights drawing upon cases in the late 19th century seeking to use the right to contract to overturn interracial marriage bans. Although those cases were unsuccessful, Purvis argues that an increasingly contractual view of marriage makes this a viable argument for domestic partnership rights.

This book describes the United Kingdom’s Civil Partnerships Act 2004, which recognizes the legal status of same-sex relationships, and examines the Act’s provisions and impact in areas such as tax, inheritance and parenting, as well as international aspects and the role of courts in dissolution proceedings.

Tenancy by the entirety -- recognized by about half the states -- provides for the "non-divisibility of interests in the property, unless agreed upon by both spouses, or after a decree of divorce, or the death of one of the spouses.... Neither an individual creditor of one of the spouses nor a unilateral transaction can sever the tenancy." This arrangement can be contrasted with other types such as "joint tenancy" -- which allows each tenant "the right to unilaterally sever the tenancy without the other's knowledge or consent" -- and "tenancy in common," which may be severed at any time by either cotenant and does not provide any survivorship rights [and is thus] useless for couples seeking to protect their property from outside creditors and individual conveyances, while also avoiding the probate process." While many writers are urging the elimination of tenancy by the entirety, the author argues that this form of shared ownership serves vital interests not only for married couples, but can be meaningfully expanded to include property protections for common law spouses, same-sex couples, and other "quasi-marital" relationships.

The present student work offers another in a growing line of well-intentioned, but ultimately misguided discourses on same-sex marriage. Schuman argues that, because religious believers oppose same-sex marriage, the best thing to do would be to separate "the institutions of civil and religious marriage such that religious groups can continue to grant or refuse to officiate marriage ceremonies based on their beliefs, and government can get out of the business of granting religious marriage and instead focus on granting equal rights to all of its citizens." The errors in this line of thinking are several, including the following. (1) marriage has always been a fundamentally social, not religious institution; religions have merely been favored as one vehicle for forming this legal bond. Consequently, if there is to be a parting of the ways, the term "marriage" should stay where it originally belonged, with secular authorities, and religions can form their own "civil unions" that trigger no legal or public consequences. Supporting this same outcome -- that government-sanctioned relationships should be "marriages," and religious celebrations merely "unions," is that the empirically observed social and psychological benefits follow from being "married," not from being "unioned," which is why these two states shall always represent unequal statuses regardless of whether they carry the same legal rights and benefits. To make religions the sole dispensers of this proven good would be to consign same-sex relationships to a permanent second-class standing.