Anthology consisting mostly of papers presented at a 2005 conference at Trinity College in Dublin. Contributors explore moral, philosophical and legal issues related to committed relationships under law, with an emphasis on same-sex couples and their families and the law of Ireland.

Because of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the unions of same-sex couples are not recognized for purposes of the filing federal taxes. This reality has advantages and disadvantages, and the author looks at both. Specifically, the author explains the “marriage penalty” and the “marriage bonus”. The author also discusses adjustments to gross income, including mortgage interest, retirement account contributions, the Child Tax Credit. Finally, the author explores the issues involved in estate planning for same-sex couples, breaking up, and joint and several liability.

All the usual suspects in the same-sex marriage controversy are summarized: DOMA, constitutional amendments, full faith and credit, and conflict of laws. Although readers who are familiar with this area of law will find little new material, the article provides a fine introduction to the issues.

Using equal protection analysis, the author of this comment hypothesizes that anti-gay partnership laws cannot survive rational basis review because their scope is too far-reaching. On the other hand, he suggests that anti-gay marriage laws may survive rational basis review because they are tailored to address concerns about family and children. Romer v. Evans [517 U.S. 620 (1996)] and Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati [128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997)] receive special attention as the author attempts to draw the distinction.

HRW provides a comprehensive report of U.S. immigration law and its effects on same-sex couples in the U.S., illustrated through compelling personal stories. Same-sex binational couples do not have the right to marry in the U.S.; consequently, such relationships do not enjoy the same privileges of immigration as their heterosexual counterparts. HRW, while it supports marriage equality, sees immigration equality as a separate issue, and advocates for the passage of the Uniting American Families Act (UAFA), which would add the category “permanent partner” to the classes of family members entitled to sponsor a foreign national for U.S. immigration. This report explores the history of exclusion from immigration in the U.S. based on gender and sexuality from McCarthyism to the HIV ban, and then reports on the lack of progress that has been made with respect to obtaining visas and immigration status for same-sex binational couples. Appendices to the report include the text of the UAFA, a list of countries protecting same-sex couples’ immigration rights, census information on binational same-sex couples in the United States, and a list of organizations that work with LGBT immigrants, asylum seekers, and binational couples.

This Note examines how the branch of law known in Europe as free movement law and in America as the right-to-travel doctrine copes with the problems created by the free movement of same-sex couples across internal borders.” The author explains that the European Union has required member states to protect the rights of migrating same-sex couples, while the United States has done exactly the opposite through the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The author suggests that same-sex couples in America seeking to challenge DOMA on federalist grounds should look to the EU for inspiration.

Denied the status of marriage, same-sex couples in virtually every state are left with no alternative other than piece-meal contractual arrangements to protect their rights and interests. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Hewitt v. Hewitt [394 N.E. 2d 1204 (Ill. 1979)], adds another barrier to equal rights for same-sex couples in the state of Illinois. The court, “in response to a claim for enforcement of an agreement between two unmarried persons of the opposite sex in a state which did not recognize common-law marriage,” held that public policy in the state of Illinois disfavored “private contractual alternatives to marriage.” The court reasoned that sexual relations could not be part of the consideration for offer and acceptance. Hewitt has not been challenged on same-sex contractual relationship grounds, but the author argues that such contractual relationships would not be legal under Hewitt.